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The success of global negotiations in structuring a new broadly based agreement towards 
greenhouse emission reduction will be much influenced by the extent to which developed 
countries have met their commitments under the current Kyoto agreement.  It is apparent 
however that many developed countries have failed to reduce their emissions, and it is 
important to understand why this has been so.  The paper examines the case of one such 
developed country, New Zealand, and the factors which have helped shape its climate policy 
implementation.  While New Zealand’s emissions have risen, few substantive steps have been 
taken to counter them in order to meet Kyoto commitments.  Barriers to effective policy action 
are shown to have been both political and economic, with the latter being reflective of issues in 
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Introduction 
In global efforts to mitigate climate change, the future impact of developing country emissions 
is as important as the historical impact of developed country emissions.  Hence securing 
developing country engagement in emission reduction efforts is critical to success.  Developing 
country participation will be much determined by the performance of developed countries in 
meeting their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol of 1997.  It is thus important to 
understand what factors have affected developed countries’ achievements so far.  By 
investigating the factors likely to promote or hinder climate action in a developed country,  this 
paper will not only consider economic, social and political constraints and opportunities of 
climate change policy on developed country achievements per se, but in so doing offer 
inferences on the prospects for securing developing country engagement by example.   
This paper investigates the actions and outcomes to 2009 in New Zealand, a country whose 
emissions situation has relevance to both developed and developing countries.  To evaluate 
New Zealand’s policy actions the paper draws on broad concepts including institutionalism and 
interest group theory.   The next section considers two important aspects of climate policy - 
carbon sinks and supplementarity - as potential means of meeting Protocol targets, especially 
for a primarily agricultural country like New Zealand.  It then considers that country’s broad 
economic circumstances and policy drivers, its level of greenhouse gas emissions, and the 
rhetoric and actions over climate policy since the 1990s.  The latter part of the paper considers 
the impact of interest groups, dominant political parties and prevailing economic perspectives 
on climate change in recent years.  The paper concludes that despite avowed idealism and 
imagery, New Zealand has so far been able to make little progress. 
Methods of Compliance 
The Protocol requires relevant developed countries (“Annex B” countries) to undertake 
specified emission reductions, but two additional concepts which were much contested in the 
negotiation of the details of Protocol implementation deserve close consideration.  These are 
the use of carbon ‘sinks’, and the issue of supplementarity. 
Debate over ‘sinks’ centred on the extent to which CO2 uptake by plant matter, largely forests, 
might be counted towards emission reductions.  Critics pointed to the fundamentally different 
nature of reduction by sinks, raising qualifications including its reversibility, and the ability to 
accurately measure them and discriminate between induced and naturally occurring CO2 
uptake - the issue of ‘additivity’ (Marland et al, 2001, 260-2).  After much debate, relatively 
liberal interpretations for sinks were finally agreed, largely through the loss of bargaining 
power by those opposing them, after the US announced its decision to not ratify the Protocol in 
2001 (Fry, 2002, 159).   
The second issue is that of supplementarity – the extent to which Annex B countries may meet 
their individual emission targets not by domestic action, but through actions by others.  The 
“Umbrella Group” countries (of which NZ was a member) argued for maximum freedom to 
use ‘flexibility mechanisms’ – systems such as emissions trading - where developed countries 
might purchase emission reductions from other countries.  The Group had in fact arisen to 
counter EU efforts to constrain the adoption of flexibility mechanisms as a substitute for 
domestic action (Yamin & Depledge, 2004, 45).  The final agreement on supplementarity, at 
Marrakesh in 2001, stated that “the use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic 
action and that domestic action shall thus constitute a  significant element of the effort made by 
each Party included in Annex I” (UNFCCC, 2001, 52).  It is this wording which governs 
application of the flexibility mechanisms for the Kyoto Protocol. 
New Zealand’s National Circumstances 
 
NZ is a small country around one tenth larger in area than the UK, but with only one fifteenth 
of its population (CIA, 2009, 1).  Much is sparsely populated, some 70% of the population 
living in only 16 major centres of population (Statistics NZ, 2008, 1).  Its major natural 
resource is productive farmland, with pasture nearly 40% of total land cover (MfE, 2007, 45).  
Other natural resources, with the exception of hydroelectricity, are modest.  Proven oil 
resources for example are minimal, and natural gas resources less than six years’ consumption 
(EIA, 2009, 1).   
 
It is one of the smallest OECD economies.  Agriculture accounts for some 4.5% of GDP, but is 
of considerably greater importance to trade.  Direct food and live animal exports comprised 
around half of New Zealand’s export trade in 2008 (OECD, 2008/1).  It is the world’s largest 
producer of traded dairy products.  One firm, Fonterra, is the world’s largest exporter of dairy 
products (The Economist, 2009, 1-2).  An important element of trade strategy was promotion of 
its ‘clean, green’ image in international marketing of agricultural products and tourism 
(Beverland, 2002, 153-160; Bell, 2008, 352-3) 
 
Export industries are very important to the economy.  NZ incurs a persistent current account 
deficit, reaching nearly 9% of GDP in 2006 (OECD, 2008/2).  That deficit is in large part 
driven by income payments (Economist, 2008, 1) servicing a substantial and growing overseas 
debt, at 126% of GDP in 2008 (RBNZ, 2008, 1).  Growth rates averaged a little over 3% in the 
early 2000s, not enough to remedy a fairly persistent fall over several decades in GDP per 
capita relative to the OECD average.  A key challenge was to raise longer-run living standards 
(OECD, 2007/1, 3), implying growth and hence a clear constraint on government policy 
measures.  
 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol most developed countries undertook to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions by varying amounts (relative to 1990) in the First Commitment period (CP1), 2008 – 
2012.  New Zealand agreed to restrain emission levels to those of 1990 (UNFCCC, 1998, 21).  




New Zealand’s GHG emissions differ markedly to other developed countries, with agriculture 
contributing around half of total emissions (MED, 2008, 5).  Even in other countries with 
substantial farming activity, that contribution was far lower – around 9% for Canada 
(Environment Canada, 2006, 8), and 16% for Australia (CoA, 2005, 4). 
 
In the period after 1990, the base year for the Kyoto Protocol, emissions rose markedly.  Gross 
emissions of all greenhouse gases rose by 26% between 1990 and 2006.1  Nett emission levels 
rose by 33%, as the sinks contribution (land use change and forestry) increased only 11% over 
                                                 
1 All percentage data rounded to whole numbers. 
the period.  The largest sectoral contributor to the emission increase was energy use, with 
energy emissions per capita increasing 34%.  That was followed by agricultural emissions 
which rose 16% (MED, 2008, 5).  These significant increases were clearly much at odds with 
New Zealand’s commitment to restrict its emissions to those of 1990. 
 
The drivers for that emissions growth had an importance unusual for most developed 
economies – the growth of car use, and expansion and intensification of agriculture in dairying.  
New Zealand’s gross emissions largely comprised carbon dioxide from energy use, and other 
gases (methane and nitrous oxide) primarily from agriculture.  Their relative importance is 
shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Overall Emission Sources 
 








% of total 
Energy use (largely CO2) 23,600 38 34,102 44 
Agriculture (largely CH4, N2O) 32,499 53 37,668 49 
Other  5,708 9 5,910 8 
Total 61,807 100 77,700 100 
Source: MED, 2008, 5 
 
Energy uses problematic elsewhere – industry and electricity generation – were not major 
factors in NZ.  Electricity from fossil fuels was less than 36% of total, coal supplying only 
some 14% in 2005.  Much supply (55%) came from hydroelectricity (IEA, 2008, 1).  
Unusually, the principal user of energy was transport, at 46% of total in 2007 (MED, 2007, 8) 
of which some 63% supported motor car use.   
 
Cars were a staple of New Zealand’s way of life for reasons including the distribution of 
population, and aspects of town planning.  Lifestyle factors played a role, with 25% of total 
kilometres travelled being for social and recreational purposes.  Also important were petrol 
prices which were among the lowest in the OECD (Perreau, 2007, 11-16).  Car ownership per 
capita in NZ was third highest in the world in 2006 (OECD, 2009, 1).  Road freight was 
significant also, and unlike other OECD countries was increasing.  Freight transport kilometres 
were increasing at a rate greater than GDP, and were projected to continue doing so without 
government measures (Mackie et al, 2006, 3). 
 
Two sources dominated agricultural emissions – methane from enteric fermentation, and 
nitrous oxide arising from nitrogenous fertiliser use, and animal waste.  Enteric fermentation is 
associated with digestion in ruminant animals such as sheep and cattle; among cattle it is 
generally higher for dairy cows than non-dairy stock (EPA, 1996, 6).  Contributions to overall 
emissions in 2006 were: 
 
Table 2  Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases, 2006 
 
Gas 
Total mass emission as CO2 
equivalent (ktCO2e) 
Portion of total non-energy 
based emission   % 
Methane - agriculture 24,866 60 
Methane – other sources   2,749   7 
Nitrous oxide – agriculture 12,802 31 
Nitrous oxide - other      493   1 
Other non-CO2 GHGs      697   2 
Total non-CO2 GHGs 41,607 100 
Source: MED, 2008, 5   
 
Smaller sources grew markedly also.  Significant emissions growth occurred between 1990 and 
2006 in industry (18%) and electricity generation (91%).  Emissions however were dominated 
by transport and agriculture – and within those sectors, by motor cars and dairying. 
 
The Outlook for Emissions 
 
NZ reported annually to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on its 
emissions and forward emissions estimates.  In 2009, those projections suggested that overall 
nett emissions for CP1 would be 3.1% lower than its Kyoto commitment.  Beneath that 
‘headline’ figure and its seemingly comfortable compliance however were details which were 
much less reassuring.  First, emissions had maintained consistent growth after 1990, reaching 
26% above 1990 levels in 2006.  Events unrelated to climate policy (drought and global 
economic events) had brought about a modest fall at that point, but growth was predicted to 
resume through CP1.  Second, previous predictions had been highly variable, from large 
surpluses to large deficits (see Table 3), and with wide confidence limits.  Actual audited 
outcome data was not expected until 2015 (MfE, 2009/1, 1-17). 
 
Table 3:  Forward Predictions of Performance Against Kyoto Target 
 
Prediction of (year) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Excess of CP1 emissions over 
Kyoto target (MtCO2e) 
-55 -33 +36 +64 +46 +22 -10 
Data from (MfE, 2009/1,17) and (MfE, 2005, 6), and rounded to whole numbers 
 
Third, with the exception of a recent partial emissions trading scheme, no substantive policy 
measures were implemented to reduce emissions in CP1.  Shifts in predicted outcomes were 
driven not by policy measures, but by either variations in measurement methodology, or 
exogenous events such as drought or global financial disruption (MfE, 2009/1, vii).  The fact 
that the target might be achieved without any material policy implementation would also 
suggest that the target itself might have been ‘soft’. 
 
Continued emissions growth meant that nominal Kyoto compliance essentially rested on the 
nett sink capacity provided by forestry and land use, together with any necessary purchase of 
emission reductions by others.  Afforestation had however fallen to its lowest level in sixty 
years, while deforestation was predicted to exceed afforestation by a factor of ten during CP1 
(MfE, 2009/2, 30-34).  In addition, a significant portion of forestry CO2 absorption being 
claimed was from plantation forests intended for later felling – with consequent release of that 
CO2 at a later date outside CP1 (Pearce, 2009, 2; SCNZ, 2009, 2), negating the original CO2 
takeup.  In all, the achievement of nominal Kyoto compliance by NZ appeared rather less than 
certain – and that by questionable means and against an emissions target which appeared low 
in the context of the intent of Kyoto commitments.   
 
Emission Reduction Measures 
 
Few measures were in place to counter that increase in GHG emissions.  The International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2009) listed measures in place in 2009.  Their database shows some 13 
items, in a range of initiatives largely based on broad framework measures.  Most were 
implemented from 2005 onwards, and five dated only from 2008.  Those implying concrete 
reduction actions were modest in their nature and impact. 
 
Principal substantive measures included an emissions trading scheme (ETS) commencing in 
2008 but with limits on participation for five years; a national energy efficiency strategy, 
commenced in 2002 and remodelled in 2007; and a variety of smaller measures. Prior to 2008 
there was in place no ‘umbrella instrument’ (Michaelowa, 2003, 34) which might integrate the 
various sectoral initiatives.  Even the 2008 ETS which might fulfil that function had, by the 
end of 2008, been substantially relaxed after a change of government in November of that year. 
 
The ETS as enacted in 2008 and revised in 2009 was very limited in its impact in CP1.  While 
forestry was included from 2008, other major sectors were, after the review, to follow later: 
• stationary energy in 2010 
• transport fuels from 2010   and 
• agriculture in 2015 - outside CP1 (NZGovt, 2009, 6)  
In addition to delayed implementation, the review led to the original scheme being ‘softened’ 
in a number of ways, including a guaranteed limit on the carbon price, extended free issue of 
permits to trade-exposed industry, and the use of emission intensity measures to determine an 
(uncapped) issue of free permits to trade-exposed industry (BellGully, 2009; WWF, 2009). 
 
In summary, the measures in place after the first year of CP1 were but recent, and modest in 
their effect.  They lacked a coordinating policy instrument.  A significant contributor to 
emission increases – agriculture – was excluded from action in CP1 altogether.  In effect, no 
significant actions had been taken, other than a ‘partial’ emissions trading scheme, to contain 
emissions in accordance with Kyoto commitments.  Before considering that outcome further, it 
is useful to look briefly at the history of New Zealand’s climate change actions. 
 
History of Climate Policy 
 
While NZ had participated in early discussions on climate change its attitude appeared 
somewhat ambivalent.  After attending the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the (then National) 
government announced the imposition of a carbon tax from 1997 to pursue the obligations it 
had assumed.  As it neared, however, the tax was deferred and never became law, in the first of 
two significant climate policy reversals.  The second occurred in 2002, when the (then Labour 
coalition) government announced a carbon tax, operational from 2007 (Ward, 2007, 4).  Like 
its predecessor, it also reversed its decision later, in December 2005, after fashioning a 
coalition government following the September 2005 election.  Several of its supporters in the 
new coalition had opposed a tax, and Kyoto generally, before the election (Ward, 2006, 21). 
 
Another move towards a broad policy instrument occurred in September 2007, when the 
Labour government proposed an emissions trading system (NZ Govt, 2007, 1).  That 
instrument was actually enacted twelve months later (NZ Govt, 2008/2, 1).  Three months 
after, following a change of government, the ETS was put to review by a Parliamentary select 
committee (NZ Govt, 2008/1, 1).  The review was a condition of support by a minority party of 
a strongly neoliberal persuasion (Reid, 2003, 275), which had strenuously opposed the ETS 
during the election.  As noted above, the review led to a significant weakening of the original 
scheme.  At the same time a number of other smaller measures were rejected also (NZPA, 
2008, 1; NBR, 2008, 1). 
 
NZ climate policy evolution was marked by “lengthy and inconclusive debates, a lack of 
consensus amongst key stakeholders, and governmental indecision” (Chapman & Boston, 
2007, 113).  That seemed to reflect a more general situation with broader environmental policy 
also.  The OECD for example, undertook Environmental Performance Reviews in New 
Zealand in 1996 and 2007.  The 1996 report commended two broad policy frameworks which 
had been put in place (an Environment 2010 Strategy and the Resource Management Act) 
(OECD, 1996, 3).  Eleven years later, the second report could only note the demise of the 
former, and material limitations on the latter.  These included an absence of clear national 
standards, an absence of quantitative performance indicators and other administrative shortfalls 
(OECD, 2007/3, 2).   
 
Overall the picture which emerges of New Zealand’s climate (and more generally, 
environmental) policy development is one of stated good intentions, with a major policy 
implementation deficit.  The discussion which follows considers possible explanations for this 
situation. 
 
Influences on Climate Policy 
 
It is argued here that three related factors - two political and one economic - have influenced 
climate policy in NZ to date.  The relative strength of interest groups promoting and opposing 
meaningful action has been important, as has been an enduring legacy of neo-liberal, market-
oriented thought dating back to an economic restructuring in the 1980s.  In terms of the 
economy, NZ has fallen behind its former peers in terms of national income.  That created an 
overarching imperative to improve per capita income, implying dependence on industry of 
significant environmental impact, in the absence of other industry development.  In this respect 
New Zealand’s position resembled that of many developing countries, facing the same conflict 




NZ was the home of the world’s first national ‘green’ party – the Values Party, in 1972.  
Contesting ‘first-past-the-post’ elections, the party achieved a high point of 5.2% of the 
national vote in 1975 but did not achieve representation.  A Green Party later emerged, and 
achieved representation following the introduction of a proportional representation (MMP) 
system, in 1999 (Carter, 2007, 106).  The Greens entered an effective coalition with Labour for 
three years, and more limited ‘cooperation agreements’ with Labour in two succeeding 
governments (IPU, 2009, 1). 
 
Aligned with the Green Party in supporting environmental arguments were various civil 
society groups, including interests from NZ conservation groups, and international groups such 
as Greenpeace.  Opposing them were bodies such as the corporate lobby group, the Business 
Roundtable, the most influential network affecting government policy of the time (Kelsey, 
1996, 75), and recognised for its “pro-business, right wing, and free-market ideology” (Milne 
et al, 2004, 20).  Allied with the Roundtable were groups including the farmers’ lobby 
Federated Farmers (Liepins & Bradshaw, 572), special purpose groups such as the Greenhouse 
Policy Coalition (of major emitters), and business generally (Yang, 2004, 9). 
 
Lobby group activity to counter threats to members’ business objectives is consistent with 
Olson’s (1971, 34) observations on the origins of collective action.  In any productive activity, 
there are likely to be individual firms whose losses, in the event of measures being enacted, are 
adequate to justify the cost of organisation, making formation of a coherent group most 
probable.  To those supporting climate action however, the converse applies.  For any potential 
group member, personal benefits are difficult to quantify and likely to be small, the probability 
of free riders near one hundred per cent, and transaction costs to structure an effective 
organisation high.  In that situation, a simple interest group perspective would suggest that the 
views of producers (emitters) are likely to prevail over the views of those favouring emission 
reduction. 
 
That disparity of influence might have been expected to be redressed by the existence of formal 
Green political representation.  That did not occur, several factors tending to diminish their 
potential influence.  First, they were but a minority of the broader body of independent parties 
to whom major parties might turn in seeking coalition partners (IPU, 2009, var), and their 
opportunity to capitalise on electoral leverage thus quite limited. 
 
This was reinforced by a political culture which remained ambivalent about the MMP electoral 
system, and the power it potentially delivered to small parties.  A third impediment to wider 
public support came from an image of the Greens as a party of the left, and one with a broader 
agenda encompassing other contentious issues.  Included among their other policies were a 
number likely to be unacceptable to both the main parties (such as opposition to unrestrained 
free trade) (Bale, 2003, 288-291).  The Greens were however credited with having stimulated 
public debate and challenged prevailing neo-liberal thought (Farquhar, 2006,  298-9).  That did 
not though translate into the critical stage of climate action – putting the Kyoto principles into 
practice in New Zealand. 
 
Government’s Own Views 
 
Interest group theory may pose a view of government as passive, a point at which contesting 
force vectors might be resolved (Odegard, 1958, 699), and hence an interest group approach 
might provide some explanation for climate policy in NZ.  But that is to overlook the active 
preferences of governments of the day, and their influence on policy determination.  It is 
argued here that successive NZ governments held views and values which were fundamentally 
inimical to the actions required to achieve New Zealand’s stated climate policy commitments. 
 
These views traced their origin to the rapid ascendancy of neoliberal thought in NZ in the early 
1980s.  The term ‘neoliberal’ (and its associated concept of economic rationalism) is used here 
simply to denote that school of thought having as its ideological core the primacy of markets, 
and commonly characterised by initiatives like deregulation, privatisation, a reduced role for 
government, and monetarism (Mudge, 2008, 705-707).  That was the nature of the 
comprehensive, radical programme which from 1984 swept NZ with “breakneck speed” from 
its relatively Keynesian, ‘welfare state’ orientation (Menz, 2005, 49). 
 
The shift was catalysed by poor economic performance, and coincided with defeat of a 
National government in July 1984 (Mein Smith, 2005, 204-208).  The Treasury in 1984 
prepared a briefing document for the incoming government which was highly ideological in 
tone (Liepins & Bradshaw, 1999, 568), and virtually a manifesto for radical action (Menz, 
2005, 60-61).  A “theory driven revolution” was then carried by a small elite including 
ministers and Treasury and Reserve Bank officials, with support from the Business Roundtable 
(Mein Smith, 2005, 211).  The reform continued through the tenure of the Labour government.   
 
Subsequent changes of government in 1990 (to National), 1999 (in a return to a Labour 
coalition) and 2008 (to a National coalition) did not materially change the nature of reforms.  
While the pace of change slowed (Menz, 2005, 52-55), the core of the reforms endured, with 
indications that conservative economic policies, and a preference for markets as an instrument 
to pursue desired outcomes, would remain a feature of the NZ political landscape.  The NZ 
Business Roundtable welcomed the most recent government of 2008 (ODT, 2008, 1), one of 
whose first acts was to effectively suspend the new emissions trading system pending a full 
review (NZPA, 2008, 1). 
 
The period over which climate policy developed in NZ was dominated by neo-liberal thought, 
which had become the ‘common sense’ (Farquhar, 2006, 76).  It had rapidly become 
institutionalised, leading to a situation where, as Beland (2005, 3) put it, “political institutions 
and previously enacted public policies [may] structure the political behaviour of bureaucrats, 
elected officials and interest groups during the policy-making process”.  That helped legitimate 
a concept of the national interest “constructed as the outcome of the sum of individual self-
interests” (Lewis & Moran, 1998, 142).  Acceptance of such ‘common sense’ was suggested by 
the findings of a major national ‘Values Study’ survey carried out in 2005.  Responses 
suggested an endorsement of individualism, with for example sixty per cent of respondents 
perceiving that laziness and lack of willpower were the principal cause of poverty in NZ (Rose 
et al, 2005, 9-16). 
 
Implementation of measures to materially reduce emissions was therefore unlikely in the 
prevailing climate of ideas in NZ.  First, the use of market-interventionist instruments itself 
contravened the orthodoxy of the day, with its emphasis on the primacy of markets – and 
indeed, as Lewis & Moran (1998, 142) suggest, on the use of the market as a policy instrument 
per se.  Second, any effective policy instruments had to influence emitters in a manner as to 
reduce their emissions.  That was unlikely to be acceptable to the Business Roundtable, to 
farmers, or even to the general public as the principal generator of transport emissions.  But 
there was another factor also, one which had faced successive governments over decades – the 




New Zealand’s economic situation is evident from its average income, or GDP per capita, 
compared to like countries.  Over several decades from 1984 (the start of the reform 
programme) to 2005, average income (PPP basis) in NZ fell from 94% of the OECD average to 
a little under 72%.  Several short periods (1992-1994, 2002-2004) saw a reversal of the trend, 
but in each case the ratio subsequently dropped to a figure lower than that before the reversal.  
Comparison to its nearest neighbour, Australia, showed a similar trend, average income in NZ 
falling from 89% of that of Australia to 71% over the same period (OECD, 2008/3, 1).  
 
Income distribution also changed.  Between 1983/4 and 1995/6, the lowest 10% of households 
by income saw a decrease in real per capita income of 8.7%, while the highest 10% saw a real 
increase of 26.5% (Dalziel, 2002, 44).  There was not only an increase in dispersion, but an 
absolute loss to those on lowest incomes.  Both capital and earnings incomes became more 
unequally distributed, disproportionately to those in the OECD generally.  The income poverty 
percentage rose from 6% in the mid 1980s to 10.5% in 2000 (OECD, 2008/4, 1).  Household 
debt rose to around 160% of disposable income by the mid 2000s, higher than most OECD 
countries (OECD, 2007/3, 1). 
 
It is not the objective here to discuss the merits of the economic restructuring but rather to note 
that high short term costs were incurred for which subsequent growth failed to compensate.  
That left New Zealanders materially less well-off than before, implying economic pressure for 
development.  The OECD in its 2007 survey was non-committal about means of redressing the 
problem.  Noting that “the main challenge is to enhance longer-run living standards” it 
commented also that “options ... are not obvious” (OECD, 2007/2, 3).  It did nonetheless 
recommend initiatives like reducing pension payments, and further privatisation of state 
enterprises (OECD, 2007/1, 8).   
 
Bertram (2003, 94-98) in a broader view identified that ultimately the main structural 
constraint on raising living standards lay in the balance of payments.  NZ could only spend as 
much foreign exchange as could be earned and/or borrowed.  Two outcomes from the reforms 
though were significant barriers in that regard.  First, the reforms had tended to diminish the 
role of the directly productive tradeable-goods sectors (the traditional sources of exports) 
compared to service sectors.  Second, the markedly increased foreign ownership of NZ assets 
had created a major income outflow, payments to overseas investors being almost completely 
responsible for New Zealand's current account deficit from the mid 1980s. 
 
Nett export growth was therefore central to any attempt to raise average income in NZ.  That 
export/growth nexus confirmed parallels with developing country Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, and their broad aim of export promotion (Barnett & Pauling, 2005, 273).  
Manufacturing, having seen very major job losses in the reforms, showed some recovery later 
but not of a scale adequate to allow NZ to escape its ‘commodity export trap’ (Willis, 2001, 4).  
In that situation, it seemed unlikely that the export earning potential of agriculture would be 
seriously put at risk through competing policy objectives.   
 
Thus the position of agriculture in NZ was similar to that in many developing countries.  In one 
direction, economic growth (and its corollary of increased per capita income) favoured 
exploitation of resources which might contribute to export earnings.  Against that, sustainable 
development concepts implied limitation of such industries to a level compatible with long 
term environmental sustainability.  While the absolute need for economic development might 
be less compelling in NZ than in many developing countries, the argument in principle was 
parallel.  In this instance, priority would appear to have remained with development, and the 
emissions that implied. 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
NZ committed through the Kyoto Protocol to reduce its GHG emissions.  As this paper has 
shown, results to date, and projections for CP1, indicate that NZ will have little to show as the 
result of domestic action – one of the implicit requirements of the Protocol.  While current 
projections suggest it will meet its nominal commitment, that result is far from certain, and 
may well depend on carbon removal by forests whose effect is later to be reversed.  Barriers to 
action have been shown to include the relative strength of contesting interest groups; the 
prevailing political ideology including both major political parties; and a continuing economic 
dependence on agricultural exports. 
 
Ultimately decisions on the level of commitment to climate action have rested with a 
succession of NZ governments.  It is reasonable to assume, given the public good nature of the 
environmental issue involved, that such decisions have been determined in the context of 
perceptions of the public interest as a motivating principle.  But that is a relatively empty 
statement without regard for what constitutes the public interest per se.  In the case examined 
here, it is argued that the perception of the public interest was constructed in a quite narrow 
perspective of national economic interest.    That in turn was influenced by a well-
institutionalised political frame of thought embodying concepts of individualism, small 
government, economic rationalism, and a commitment to markets as an organising principle. 
 
What then must change if countries in such a situation are to contribute meaningfully to global 
emission reduction initiatives?  Two alternatives seem possible – that either the concept of 
public interest is broadened by the addition of other factors, or that within the prevailing view 
of public interest the set of incentives change to encourage a different course of action.  In the 
case of the former, clearly greater demonstrated leadership in actions by other countries 
(particularly the US) may add global citizenship values to a local focus, in a manner as to bring 
about a broader view of what constitutes the overall public interest.  In terms of the latter, 
incentive changes for example might include potential economic impacts through export target 
countries reaching a view that NZ is not embracing global environmental goals.  In that 
situation, it would be an irony if it were markets which ultimately provided a remedy to what is 
a problem in part founded in market primacy. 
 
Whatever may be the outcome, the case of New Zealand demonstrates clearly that however 
global in nature the policy problem may be, in the end it is domestic policy and measures 
through which the problem must be addressed.  The determinants of those domestic policy 
approaches are therefore central to the resolution of the global issue concerned, the mitigation 
of climate change through greenhouse gas emission reduction. 
References 
1. Bale, Tim (2003) “The Greens” in New Zealand: Government and Politics ed Raymond 
Miller, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2003. 
2. Barnett, Jon & Jonathan Pauling, (2005) “The Environmental Effects of New Zealand’s 
Free-market Reforms“ Environment, Development and Sustainability 7 (2005). 
3. Beland, Daniel (2005) ‘Ideas and Social Policy: An Institutionalist Perspective’ Social 
Policy & Administration 39 (1) Feb 2005. 
4. Bell, Claudia (2008) “100% PURE New Zealand: Branding for Backpackers” Journal if 
Vacation Marketing 14 (4) 2008. 
5. Bell Gully (2009) “New Zealand passes into law key changes to its emissions trading 
scheme” Accessed 4 Dec 2009 at http://www.bellgully.com/resources/resource.02440.asp  
6. Bertram, Geoff (2003) “New Zealand Since 1984: Elite Succession, Income Distribution 
and Economic Growth in a Small Trading Economy” GeoJournal 59, 2003. 
7. Beverland, Michael & Adam Lindgreen (2002) “Using Country of Origin in Strategy: the 
Importance of Context and Strategic Action” Journal of Brand Management 10 (2) Nov 
2002. 
8. Carter, Neil (2007) The politics of the environment : ideas, activism, policy Cambridge 
University Press, 2007 
9. Chapman, Ralph and Jonathan Boston, (2007) “The Social Implications of Decarbonising 
the New Zealand Economy” Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 31, July 2007. 
10. CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) (2009) The World Factbook 2009.  Accessed 18 May 
2009 at https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/print/nz.html  
11. CoA (Commonwealth of Australia) (2005), Australia’s Fourth National Communication on 
Climate Change  Commonwealth of Australia, 2005  Accessed 22 Oct 2007 at 
http://unfccc.int/national _reports/annex_i_natcom/ submitted_natcom/items/ 3625.php  
12. Craig, Geoffrey (2008) “Aotearoa/New Zealand Print News Media Reportage of the 
Environment” Media International Australia 127 May 2008 
13. Dalziel, Paul, (2002) “New Zealand’s Economic Reforms: an Assessment” Review of 
Political Economy, 14 (1), 2002 
14. EIA (Energy Information Administration) (2009) New Zealand Energy Profile April 10 
2009.  Accessed 15 May 2009 at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/ 
country_energy_data.cfm?fips=NZ 
15. Environment Canada (2006), National Inventory Report 1990 – 2004.  Accessed 19 May 
2009 at http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg _inventories/ 
national_inventories_submissions/items/3734.php  
16. EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) (1996) Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission 
Factors, Volume 1: Stationary Point and Area Sources AP 42, Fifth Edition, 1996.  
Accessed 30 Oct 2008 at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/ch14/final/c14s04.pdf  
17. Farquhar, Russell Murray, (2006) Green Politics and the Reformation of Liberal 
Democratic Institutions. Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of 
Canterbury, 2006.  Accessed 02 Feb 2009 at http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/944  
18. Fry, Ian (2002) “Twists and Turns in the Jungle: Exploring the Evolution of Land Use, 
Land-Use Change and Forestry Decisions Within the Kyoto Protocol” RECIEL 11 (2) 2002 
19. IEA (International Energy Agency) (2008), Electricity/Heat in New Zealand in 2005.  
Accessed 29 Oct 2008 at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/stats/ electricitydata.asp? 
COUNTRY_CODE=NZ 
20. IEA (International Energy Agency), (2009),  Addressing Climate Change (Database). 
Accessed 7 Jan 2009 at http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/? mode=cc&action=view& 
country=New%20Zealand   
21. IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union) (2009) New Zealand House of Representatives: Historical 
Archive of Parliamentary Election Results.  Accessed 21 May 2009 at 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2233_arc.htm  
22. Kelsey, Jane (1996) The New Zealand Experiment Auckland University Press, Auckland, 
1996 
23. Lewis, N & W Moran (1998) “Restructuring, Democracy and Geography in New Zealand” 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 16, 1998. 
24. Liepins, Ruth & Ben Bradshaw (1999) “Neo-Liberal Agricultural Discourse in New 
Zealand: Economy, Culture and Politics Linked” Sociologia Ruralis, 39 (4) 1999 
25. Mackie, Hamish, Peter Baas & Hansjorg Manz, (2006) Prediction of New Zealand’s 
Freight Growth by 2020, Transport Engineering Research New Zealand Ltd, March 2006. 
26. Marland, Gregg, Kristy Fruit & Roger Sedjo (2001) “Accounting for sequestered carbon: 
the question of permanence” Environmental Science & Policy, 4 (2001). 
27. MED (Ministry of Economic Development) (2007) New Zealand Energy Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions. Accessed 27 Oct 2008 at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocument TOC____38356.aspx 
28. MED (Ministry of Economic Development) (2008) New Zealand Energy Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Aug 2008.  Accessed 20 Oct 2008 at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocument TOC____38356.aspx   
29. Mein Smith, Philippa (2005) A Concise History of New Zealand Cambridge University 
Press, New York 2005. 
30. Menz, Georg (2005) “Making Thatcher Look Timid: the Rise and Fall of the New Zealand 
Model” in Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of 
National Varieties of Capitalism ed Soederberg, Susanne, Georg Menz and Philip G Cerny, 
Palgrave, Houndmills, 2005. 
31. MfE (Ministry for Environment) (2005) Annual Report on Climate Change Policy 
Implementation 2004/2005  Accessed 28 Jun 2005 at 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/annual-report-05/annual-report-policy-
implementation.html  
32. MfE (Ministry for Environment) (2008): Net Position Report 2008. Accessed 4 Nov 2008 
at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/net-position-report-projected-balance-
emissions-may08/index.html  
33. MfE (Ministry for the Environment), (2007) Environment New Zealand 2007,Dec 2007.  
Accessed 18 May 2009 at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/ser/enz07-dec07/  
34. MfE, (2009): : MfE (Ministry for Environment) Net Position Report 2009. Accessed 17 
Apr 2008 at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/ 
publications/climate/net-position -report-2009/index.html  
35. Michaelowa, Axel (2003) “Germany – a pioneer on earthen feet?” Climate Policy (3) 2003. 
36. Milne, Markus J, Helen Tregidga and Sara Walton, (2004) Playing With Magic Lanterns: 
The New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development and Corporate Triple 
Bottom Line Reporting Working Paper, Department of Accountancy and Business Law, 
University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.  Accessed 30 Jan 2009 at 
http://eprints.otago.ac.nz /8/1/PLAYING_ WITH_MAGIC_ LANTERNS.pdf 
37. Mudge, Stephanie Lee (2008) “The State of the Art: What is Neo-Liberalism?” Socio-
Economic Review 6, 2008. 
38. NZ Government, (2007) Launch of emissions trading scheme, 20 Sept 2007.  Accessed 29 
Jan 2009 at http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/30691 
39. NZ Government, (2008/1) Climate change select committee established (Media Release). 
Accessed 29 Jan 2009 at http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/ climate+change+ 
select+committee+established 
40. NZ Government, (2009) Emissions trading scheme basics  Accessed 4 Dec 2009 at 
http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/basics.html   
41. NZPA (NZ Press Association), (2008) ETS Review Comes Under Fire .  Accessed 29 Jan 
2009 at http://www.guide2.co.nz/politics/news/ets-review-comes-under-fire/11/3924 
42. Odegard, Peter H. (1958) “A Group Basis of Politics: A new Name for an Ancient Myth” 
The Western Political Quarterly 11 (3) Sep 1958 
43. ODT (Otago Daily Times) (2008) “Use Sir Roger's expertise, says Roundtable” 10 Nov 
2008.  Accessed 16 Feb 2009 at http://www.odt.co.nz/election-2008/the-nation/31189/use-
sir-roger039s-expertise-says-roundtable 
44. OECD (2007/1): Policy Brief : Economic Survey of New Zealand, 2007.  Accessed 3 Mar 
2009 at http://www.oecd.org/document/ 13/0,3343,en_2649_33733_ 
38415949_1_1_1_1,00.html 
45. OECD (2007/2) Economic survey of New Zealand 2007: Raising New Zealand's living 
standards_Summary, 2007.  Accessed 25 May 2009 at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3343,en_2649_ 33733_38415949_1_1_1_1,oo.html 
46. OECD (2008/1) Trade in value classified by sections of SITC 2008.  Accessed 14 Oct 2008 
at http://oecd-stats.ingenta.com. ezproxy.uow.edu.au:2048/ 
OECD/TableViewer/download.aspx  
47. OECD (2008/2) Country Statistical Profiles (NZ) 2008.  Accessed 15 May 2009 at 
http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CSP2008 
48. OECD (2008/3) Factbook 2008: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics: National 
income per capita 2008.  Accessed 20 Feb 2009 at 
http://ocde.p4.siteinternet.com/publications/doifiles/02-01-02-t1.xls  
49. OECD (2008/4) Growing Unequal?  Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries.  
Country Note: New Zealand. 2008.  Accessed 23 Feb 2009 at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/43/41527985.pdf  
50. OECD (2009) Country Statistical Profiles 2007:  Road Motor Vehicles.  Accessed  31 Mar 
2009 at http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?querytype=view &queryname=91 
51. OECD, (2007/3), Environmental Performance Review Of New Zealand: Conclusions And 
Recommendations.  Accessed 13 Oct 2008 at http://www.oecd.org/document/ 
10/0,2340,en_2649_34307_37915274_1_1_1_1,00.html 
52. OECD, (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) (1996), Environmental 
Performance Reviews: New Zealand (1996) - Conclusions & Recommendations.  Accessed 
29 Jan 2009 at http://www.oecd.org/publicationanddocuments/0,3395,en_ 
33873108_33873658_1_1_1_14_1,00.html 
53. Olson, Mancur (1971) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups, Revised edition, Harvard University Press 1971. 
54. Pearce, Fred (2009)“New Zealand’s ‘Kyoto forests’ sow the seeds for a massive emissions 
surge” The Guardian 19 November 2009. 
55. Perreau, Katharine, (2007) Wanting to Get Up and Go: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Transport Energy Policy in New Zealand.  Paper to International Association for Energy 
Economics conference, Wellington, New Zealand, February 2007. 
56. RBNZ (Reserve Bank of New Zealand) (2008) New Zealand's overseas debt 29 Sept 2008.  
Accessed 20 Oct 2008 at http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/extfin/e3/data.html  
57. Reid, Nicola (2003) “ACT” in New Zealand: Government and Politics ed Raymond Miller, 
Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2003. 
58. Rose, E, J. Huakau and S Casswell (2005) Economic Values: A Report from the New 
Zealand Values Study, 2005 Centre for Social and Health Outcomes & Te Ropu Whariki 
(SHORE), Auckland June 2005.   
59. Statistics NZ (2008) New Zealand in Profile 2008.  Accessed 18 May 2009 at 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/products-and-services/new-zealand-in-profile-2008/default.htm . 
60. SCNZ (Sustainability Council of NZ) (2009) “ETS: Bill to a FutureGeneration” Accessed 
10 Dec 2009 at http://www.sustainabilitynz.org/docs/ 
ETSBillToAFutureGenerationNov09.pdf 
61. The Economist (2008) “Economic Data” 24 Sept 2008.  Accessed 20 Oct 2008 at 
http://www.economist.com/countries/ NewZealand/profile.cfm? 
folder=Profile%2DEconomic%20Data 
62. The Economist (2009) “New Zealand food: Dairy dismay” 23 Feb 2009.  Accessed 3 Mar 
2009 at http://viewswire.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=ib3 Article&article_ 
id=1294279714&pubtypeid=1122462497&rf=0 
63. UNFCCC (2001), The Marrakesh Accords & The Marrakesh Declaration, 10 November 
2001, accessed 21 Jan 2009 at http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf  
64. UNFCCC, (1998), Kyoto Protocol To The United Nations Framework Convention On 
Climate Change, Accessed 15 May 2009 at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
65. Ward, Murray (2007) Submission on the Draft New Zealand Energy Strategy to 2050 and 
Related Climate Change Documents 30 March 2007, Accessed 12 Sep 2008 at 
http://www.gtriplec.co.nz/new-zealand-kyoto  
66. Ward, Murray, (2006) “Ís There Now a Role for Economic Instruments in New Zealand’s 
Domestic Climate Change Policy?” Policy Quarterly 2 (1) 2006. 
67. Willis, Richard (2001) “Introduction” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 42 (1) Apr 2001. 
68. Yamin, Farhana and Joanna Depledge, (2004), The International Climate Change Regime 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004 
69. Yang, Jian (2004) “New Zealand and the Kyoto Protocol” New Zealand International 
Review29 (3) May-June 2004:  
 
